Establishing a Culture of Peace

This appeared on Times of Israel and Matav Blog

As with any insider view, Michael Herzog’s eye opening account of what happened during the last round of Israeli Palestinian negotiations contains fascinating details.

There is a confirmed backchannel of Dennis Ross, Isaac Molho and Hussein Agha. We learn of what turned out to be a confusing shuttle diplomacy strategy by the Americans. The timeline of the collapse is clarified and the internal discussions of the Israeli side are revealed in greater depth.

As commentators and analysts go through the details, deducing lessons for future efforts, much attention will be paid to the mistakes in process and the reality of the gaps in the positions.

In the zone of possible agreement section, Herzog gives the readers a glimpse of where the parties were on key issues. Much was already suspected. He goes through the question of Jewish State, something that Kerry would later publicly pick up in his last speech on the issue, telling the world that there had been progress made on a regional level on this issue. He details the security work that General Allen’s team undertook, something that the Commanders for Israel’s Security and the Center for a New American Security later spelled out in greater detail. The refugee question got updated to include the plight of Jews from Arab lands (though the conversations were never concluded) and Jerusalem was punted.

All of this was pretty much suspected if not known by the end of the Obama administration. Yet Herzog finishes his account of the possible agreement with a surprising final line.

“Finally, a new section initiated by Tzipi Livni on the “Culture of Peace” was introduced.”

Herzog offers no analysis or explanation but a footnote to an interview that Livni held with David Horowitz, the editor of the Times of Israel, in September 2014.

Towards the end of the interview Livni revealed that there was agreed text of what a culture of peace should look like. Below is the full part of the interview.

That’s not my point. What I’m asking is why you haven’t focused on the centrality of the need to put an end to the incitement against Israel, and to create a more honest narrative?

You’re wrong. I suggested at the start of the negotiations (in 2013) that we finalize the clause relating to the so-called “Culture of Peace” in the future agreement. First of all, implementing that clause need not wait for a full agreement. Let me see if I can find you the text. (Livni searches in her i-Pad.) It has been a while. I’m not talking here about the bilateral committees on incitement, where each side ran to complain about the other. This is something (we worked on) with Abu Mazen, which did not get implemented but which I really think has to be done.

We also need to look at ourselves. I’m Israeli. I want to protect Israel. That’s my chief interest. But to say that our texts…

… and our maps that don’t show the West Bank. No, we’re not perfect.

Or describing the Palestinians as “shrapnel in the butt” (a reference to Economy Minister Naftali Bennett’s likening of the Palestinian conflict last year to shrapnel in the rear end — DH).

So, I’m very much in favor of the Palestinians being okay, but we should be too. And one doesn’t contradict the other. Both sides have to be okay. (Livni finds a document and shows it to me on her i-Pad.) This was a text on civil society and the culture of peace. It was meant to be part of any agreement. Here we set out…

Can I have a copy of this?

 No, there’s a limit. (She laughs.) But you can look. You can see there are clauses against “supporting incitement.” A whole section… (The section of the document Livni shows me deals with preventing racism and discrimination, and features language highlighting the imperative to “promote mutual understanding, tolerance and respect.”)

If you implement steps like these, it might be gradually possible to help create a different atmosphere.

I wanted to do it simultaneously. Not to halt everything. I thought it could be implemented. That didn’t happen. 

Again, surely he should have an interest in implementing this.

Who do you mean by “he”? 

The leader you’re not representing in this interview.

(Livni laughs.) And you’re assuming that he’s the one who refused? Look, it didn’t happen. You know what, it didn’t happen. We immediately also got into the core issues. I suggested it to the Americans.

This “Culture of Peace” proposal also included clauses relating to incitement by religious leaders, media…?

Everything. Everything. Actually, I think we had an agreed text. I’ll check again. Had we extended the talks (last spring), I think we were going to implement it during the extended negotiations. But we didn’t reach an agreement to extend the negotiations.

I think it’s something that should be implemented anyway. I’m telling you, I suggested it at the very beginning.”

One of the challenges of the negotiations between Israel and the PLO has always been that ‘nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon’. The linkage means that incremental process is invalidated unless a final deal is achieved. This keeps key concessions locked away until every part of the deal is worked out so it can be sold to both populations as a package deal.

Yet the problems that a deal will solve metastasize in its absence, making compromises harder and harder to reach. The most obvious and well known is that of settlements. The longer there is no agreement on borders the more that settlements grow, making it harder to generate the political will to pull back by creating new facts on the ground.

While the settlements are a physical manifestation of a barrier to progress, no less significant is the fear, mistrust and hate that the conflict has generated between the populations. While the power balance between Israelis and Palestinians is asymmetric, the mistrust and fear is equal. If political will is needed to open the space to get to an agreement between the parties, then the agreement of creating a culture of peace cannot wait until a full agreement is signed. It is needed as a necessary precondition.

Livni in her interview recognizes this, stating that this clause should be implemented anyway.

With the collapse of the negotiations, the Quartet report of July 2016 became the next key document to lay out a way forward. The final recommendation of the report requested that,

“Both parties should foster a climate of tolerance, including through increasing interaction and cooperation in a variety of fields – economic, professional, educational, cultural – that strengthen the foundations for peace and countering extremism.”

Since then legislators in the US and UK have advanced a concept of an International Fund for Israeli Palestinian Peace, whose aim would be to actualize a strategic, scalable attempt to create a culture of peace through dedicated funding. It is based off the successful International Fund for Ireland. Later this month the United States Institute of Peace is holding a half-day conference on the lessons that can be learnt between the two funds. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who oversaw the Good Friday agreement and was the Quartet representative for many years, has endorsed this idea.

What these efforts toward the fund realize is that one of the consequences from previous failures has been an incredulity gap that now exists between the two peoples. If this cannot be bridged, Israelis and Palestinians will continue to drift further apart, making any deal politically impossible for the parties to sign. The ‘culture of peace’ work is needed to ensure that the populations move their leaders closer together, rather than drive them further apart.

With the revelation that there is agreed upon text out there, it should be released and form the basis for the proposed fund to sit upon. While borders, Jerusalem, security, refugees and the other final status suffer from a linkage that makes them rise and fall together, it is never too early to start the excruciating, necessary work of trying to break the barriers of mistrust and hate. While a culture of peace cannot survive in the absence of a political horizon, a political horizon cannot be created without a population who believes that peace is possible.

Is a peace deal possible if Israelis and Palestinians simply don’t trust each other?

This piece is coauthored with Sarah Yerkes and was published by Brookings on Jan 4th

 Much has been written about Secretary of State John Kerry’s parting remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But while most of the analysis has focused on whether the speech was too harsh on Israel or how well Kerry defended the U.S. abstention in the United Nations, one theme of the speech has been overlooked: the idea that the two-state solution’s cause of death is not likely to be settlements or incitement, but rather the total lack of trust between Israelis and Palestinians. As Kerry said:

“In the end, I believe the negotiations did not fail because the gaps were too wide, but because the level of trust was too low. Both sides were concerned that any concessions would not be reciprocated and would come at too great a political cost. And the deep public skepticism only made it more difficult for them to be able to take risks.”

That line is important for multiple reasons. First, it underscores that the belief gap between the Israeli and Palestinian leadership today is so wide that even if they agree completely on all of the final status issues—borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements—they are incapable of making a deal. Second, the leaders on both sides will never take the necessary risks for an agreement without overwhelming public support. That is, while public trust and support may not be a sufficient condition for a just and lasting peace, it is a necessary one. And third, the innovation that is needed to get to a deal is not finding ever-new bridging formulas on the final status issues, of which the Kerry principles are just the latest iteration, but rather a focus on how to start traversing the incredulity gap that divides the people.

Mind the gap

Secretary Kerry is correct that nothing expands the belief gap more than continued settlement building on the Israeli side and glorification of violence on the Palestinian side. The crux of the quest for peace has been the concept of land for peace, and both parties seem incapable of giving the other side what they need to believe. Israelis may talk a good game, but Netanyahu’s statements about his willingness to negotiate land fall on deaf ears while settlement outposts continue to grow. The Palestinian security cooperation might keep the worst of the violence off the streets of Israel, but no level of coordination will be enough while stabbers and shooters of Israeli civilians are lionized by Fatah and monuments are dedicated to them.

Building trust between the populations requires different strategies than those for building track-one negotiations. It requires a systematic outreach approach to civil society, both in attention and, when appropriate, funding. At best, the U.S. government, alongside the other interested nations, aided civil society work in episodic bursts. At worst, they saw it as irrelevant while negotiations were ongoing.

We have both worked for years—one of us within the U.S. government, the other with Israeli, Palestinian, and American NGOs—to make the case that any peace process will fail without public support. Thus, we agree with Kerry’s comments that focusing solely on the Israeli and Palestinian leadership and ignoring the people will only perpetuate this situation of total distrust. Yet it is frustrating that it took Kerry four years to understand this point.

To be clear, the civil society track is an “and” rather than an “or.” It buttresses other strategies and enables their successes, rather than stands alone. While it is not sufficient, it is necessary for any initiative to be successful.

Unlike settlements and incitement, which are driven far more by Israeli and Palestinian domestic considerations than international policy, engagement with the Israeli and Palestinian publics is one area where the U.S. negotiating team could have played a positive and effective role. Had Secretary Kerry realized in 2012 the importance of encouraging the public to push their leaders to stay at the negotiating table, he would have likely invested more time and money in supporting the efforts of civil society groups dedicated to preserving the two-state solution. Instead, the State Department largely ignored civil society, remaining laser-focused on the top leaders.

There is one important exception to this point. The U.S. government has repeatedly and strongly defended Israeli civil society in the face of an increasing attack by the Israeli government. During Kerry’s tenure as Secretary, the United States forcefully pushed back against different iterations of a harsh NGO law that particularly targeted foreign funding of human rights organizations.

However, during the 2013-2014 negotiations, Kerry made over three dozen trips to Israel and the West Bank. Yet despite the millions of miles flown and the tremendous amount of time that the secretary spent in the region, he never found a moment to meet with civil society. These were the groups, the people, whose expectations were raised when President Obama said in his 2013 speech in Jerusalem:

“And let me say this as a politician—I can promise you this, political leaders will never take risks if the people do not push them to take some risks. You must create the change that you want to see. Ordinary people can accomplish extraordinary things.”

Civil societies were expected to market the negotiations to their skeptical people, knowing that their governments were pouring cold water on them. Throughout the 14 months of negotiations, no senior member of the negotiating team held a town hall or public meeting with those who were expected to sell the process—either to hear their concerns or to give them the necessary boost to build domestic support for their efforts. And while there were some private attempts at outreach to civil society, they were insufficient and lacked the necessary high-level support to move the dial. When even the negotiators don’t take the efforts of those supporting them seriously, it is hard for them to be taken seriously within their own societies and by their own leadership.

Throughout the Obama administration, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided $10 million a year in funding reconciliation programs between Arabs and Jews, Israelis and Palestinians. Not once did this line item make it into the Obama administration’s budget. Each year it was added to the federal budget after considerable effort on the congressional level in an ever-more difficult fiscal environment. When compared to how much the United States spends on military assistance to Israel and paying down the debts of the Palestinian Authority, it is a fraction of the resource to something that the administration only now recognizes as the underlying foundation to move forward.

Ball in Trump’s court

The next administration, whose dedication to the two-state solution is questionable, might look for some out-of-the-box ideas to try and unstick the parties and move the situation to a more stable setting. If we have any advice for them it is this, it starts with hope and change. It might seem odd that the Obama slogan needs to the be organizing philosophy for their approach to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but without hope, the parties will never move beyond their retrenchment. The key to hope is change, that the status quo can be different, that people do have agency.

To help each society recognize this potential, all the tools in the foreign policy toolkit must be used, including working with civil society groups. That’s essential for delivering that message and demonstrating to skeptical people that we are in a new era with new opportunities.

This should include:

  • Senior level advisors, including the new advisor for International Negotiations Jason Greenblatt, meeting with not just the parties, but civil society groups privately as well publically;
  • Inclusion of the USAID people-to-people reconciliation grant program into the federal budget; and
  • Leveraging U.S. dollars off those of the rest of the international community in the creation of an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, which currently enjoys bipartisan support, that can provide the necessary bandwidth and budget for a systemic approach to the trust deficit.

We are glad Secretary Kerry understands how important it is to establish trust and confidence among the leaders in order to preserving the two-state solution. And we are glad he made a strong case for why the Israeli and Palestinian people must push their leaders to take political risks.

With the Paris peace conference on the horizon, a new U.S. administration being sworn in, and the parties jockeying for position in the new environment we hope that the lessons that took four years for Secretary Kerry to learn can be remembered and reflected on as seriously as the principles that he presented.

For Israel, Syria Intervention is Both a Security Imperative and Risk

Daily Beast 8/27/13

After Secretary Kerry’s strong statement yesterday, there is little doubt that the U.S. and its allies plans to carry out a military strike against Syria in the coming days. With over 1,000 people dead following a chemical weapons attack, there is really little choice in the matter.

It seems that Israeli military intelligence discovered the smoking gun via intercepted calls between senior commanders in Assad’s army.

178363954CS008_John_Kerry_M
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry delivers a statement about the use of chemical weapons in Syria at the Department of State August 26, 2013 in Washington, DC. (Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images)

On Friday, Israel’s Channel 2 News reported that the weapons were fired by the 155th Brigade of the 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army, a division under the command of the Syrian president’s brother, Maher Assad. The nerve gas shells were fired from a military base in a mountain range to the west of Damascus, according to the report.

The images of children gassed to death in the country next door galvanized leading voices from across Israel’s governing coalition to urge for international intervention. From the Jewish Home’s Naftali Bennett on the right, to the dovish president Shimon Peres, there is broad agreement: From both security and ethical perspectives, Israel cannot allow chemical weapons to be used on its door step.

Over the past three years there has been an ongoing debate between foreign policy analysts about whether Israel wants Assad to stay or to go. On the one hand, it’s good to have a strong man in place to keep things quiet across the border. But this particular strong man is also in league with Iran and Hezbollah, with his survival directly tied to theirs.

By urging international intervention in Syria, Israel is of course running a security risk. Much like Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War of 1991, Assad’s most obvious response would be to attack Israel. If Israel responds, that could potentially enflame the region, which would play right into Assad’s hands. The Syrian dictator probably hopes the Arab world would rally around the flag and be distracted from the atrocities he is responsible for in his own country.

I am sure that there are many high level discussions going on now, with Israeli officials urging their American counterparts not to respond in case of a Syrian counter attack, as they did in 1991 when the enemy was Iraq. But the U.S. is not the same as it was 22 years ago and neither is Israel. Netanyahu has been clear today—Israel is not part of the Syrian Civil war, but if they are attacked, they will respond with force.

With Obama’s “red line” regarding chemical weapons now breached, the situation is worrying. If the U.S./NATO forces respond with military action against Syria, would Assad lash out by unleashing chemical weapons on Israel? This is an open question. But there is no doubt that the stakes are higher now than they have been since 1973.

I believe that the international community must act and should have acted long ago, given that at least 100,000 Syrians have been killed over the past two years. A failure to respond to the use of chemical weapons would be a green light, signaling that non-conventional weapons are back on the table. But it is vital to remember that Israel that will be on the front lines of a response even if they do not participate in any military action against Syria.

The unfolding events of this week are a constant reminder that Israel is located in an unstable region and faces security challenges every day. While we should all understand the need for an international response to chemical weapons we should remember that the Syrian response will attempt to make Israel into its whipping boy.

Diaspora Jews and placard politics

Ha’aretz 7/28/13 

With the announcement of new Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations from U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, I’m bracing myself for the inevitable pro-Israel debate that is about to dominate my inbox, Twitter and Facebook.

One of the saddest things about being a Jew who lives outside of Israel is the ”pro-Israel” debate that seems to consume Diaspora communities. The reduction of the complex relationship that a Jew has with Israel has been morphed into placard politics that ignore everything but the politics of the day. The reductionist nature of this conversation, the tribalism that enables it to consume thousands of communal funds and hundreds of communal hours is ultimately self-destructive.

The Jewish peoples’ relationship with Israel has never been simple. Where Zionism fits into one’s Jewish identity is a complex philosophical and personal journey that often develops throughout one’s life. This, of course, does not preclude one from taking a political position, yet it is all too often the be-all and end-all of many Jews’ relationships to the state.

The self-destructive nature of this issue stems from the shallowness of political support. If the entirety of your relationship with Israel can fit on a placard, you are doing it wrong. This does not preclude one from becoming an anti-Zionist, a post-Zionist, an expansionist-Zionist or a liberal-Zionist. It does mean, however, that one’s journey through Zionism should not be based solely on a boo-hurrah news cycle.

The abandonment of Zionism as a topic within much of the mainstream discourse has seeded our intellectual challenge and heritage for others to define, use and abuse. To be a Jew was always something complex, the modern state of Israel enriches that complexity.

Due to the political nature of the Israel debate, many Jewish communities around the world have been instituting red lines that set the limits of communal discourse. Depending on what you put on your placard, you are either given or denied access to the table.

This approach compounds the issues I am describing rather then helps them. With the exception of inciting violence (which should be banned no matter where it comes from), the communal red lines should not be based on political positions, but on how they were arrived at.

If as a result of a deeply complex Jewish journey and self exploration one has arrived at a position some consider an anathema, they should be invited to discuss that position with those who have traveled the same road but reached a different conclusion. If, however, their position is based on letters to the editor that start with “As a Jew,” then their placard Zionism or anti-Zionism does not merit discussion.

Of course I realize that this test is almost impossible to judge. How do we discern between the genesis of a position being a place of deep thought or a reflex? Is it intellectually arrogant to deny a platform to those without well-thought out political positions?

I do believe this it necessary. The constant politicization of Jewish identity is leading many to ignore and abandon Judaism altogether. We desperately need to ground our conversations in an educational rather than political framework. This does not stop opportunities from being political calls to action, but does mean that groups that solicit Jews primarily as Jews on the basis of a political talking point around Israel need to examine the collateral damage they are doing in their wake.

Kerry’s Progress so Far

Pieria 7/8/13

After John Kerry was appointed Secretary of State, he made the Middle East Peace Process his personal mission. Post the President’s visit, John Kerry has visited Israel and Palestine 5 times trying to get the parties back to the negotiating table. Below is a short review of what Kerry has achieved and where the sticking points have been in trying to get the negotiations back on track*.

It was clear from the start that Kerry wanted to use Jordan as an additional mediator in the eventual negotiations and use the framework of the Arab Peace Initiative as the regional support for the talks themselves. In this way he could avoid the mistakes of the 2000 Camp David accords. Starting off on his first trip he listened to the demands of each side and quickly got a ‘negotiation’ deposit from each. Israel would release the tax revenues to the PA and in return the PA would not go to the ICC or the UN. Abbas gave Kerry a three month guarantee on this (the time running out somewhere in mid-June.) In addition he negotiated with the Arab League to accept small border swaps to the API’s language.

Over the next few visits Kerry clarified the various demands of each party and split the negotiations into three tracks. The political he took full control over. Economically he has put together a $4 billion incentive package to help build Palestine through the private sector and has asked Tony Blair to lead. On the security track he has appointed General Allen to work with the Israelis on their concerns with the hope of answering many of them and, ultimately, taking them off the negotiation table.

So far the leaks seem to indicate that General Allen is getting a cold shoulder from the Israelis who are distrustful of international peace keeping forces. Meanwhile, at the World Economic Forum in Jordan Kerry revealed that there was an economic track in place but has not revealed any additional information apart from the $4 billion price tag.

On the political track Netanyahu has maintained that he is willing to negotiate without any pre-conditions, though he has indicated that the conflict is around the Palestinians accepting Israel as a Jewish State. Abbas has laid out three conditions to rejoin the talks:

  1. A settlement freeze
  2. Release of the Pre-Oslo Prisoners (approx. 120)
  3. Netanyahu to accept that the 67 borders form the starting point for the discussion (or for Netanyahu to present a map)

On Kerry’s last visit to the region (end of June) he spent three days trying to hammer out a compromise position from each party on these issues in order to get the talks started in Amman. Abbas has agreed to hold off with international moves until September, but each party is keen to produce some progress by the start of Ramadan (July 8th) where a prisoner release would be significant.

Abbas was demanding that all 120 prisoners be released at the launch of the talks. In return he would accept a full settlement freeze outside the ‘blocs’ and a partial freeze inside the blocs and East Jerusalem. He would also accept John Kerry’s commitment to the ‘67 lines being the basis rather than Netanyahu making the commitment.

Netanyahu agreed to all of the above it seems except the number of prisoners to be released. He feared that if he were to release all 120 upfront there would be nothing to keep the Palestinians from abandoning the talks and going to the UN in September anyway. Over three days the number the US negotiators managed to get Netanyahu to was 60, of which 20 would be released at the start of the talks, the other forty during.

Abbas rejected this and said that if there were not 120 then he would need a full settlement freeze and Netanyahu to personally accept the ‘67 lines. He feared he would look weak and compromising with only a minibus of 20 prisoners to Hamas’s 1000 prisoners that were freed in exchange for Gilad Schalit.  Netanyahu responded saying that if he was going to say ‘67 lines that Abbas would have to accept all of the Israeli security arrangements as is, including a long term military arrangement in the Jordan valley at the start of the process.

Kerry did not manage to break through this Gordian knot and has left two of his advisors in the region to see if they can fashion together a bridging proposal to get the talks started. In general it seems that the Palestinians are very clear with Kerry about pre-conditions and their final positions on all the key issues. Israel is focused on incentive packages to get the negotiations started and some vague language around the different issues. They are refusing to negotiate outside the negotiations themselves.

After all of his efforts remains totally unclear whether, even if the parties do agree to negotiations, a zone of possible agreement actually exists.

*This information is correct as of July 1st 2013 and is based off public forms of information.

UPDATE 7/21/13

Kerry announced that he had managed to get an agreement on the basis to have talks. Rather then having Bibi and Abbas speak to each other directly, Livni and Erekat will lead each team meeting in Washington DC this week with the hope of an announcement to follow.

Kerry has insisted on upmost secrecy in these talks so it is hard to work out what has been agreed and what has not. What we know so far is that Israel has agreed to release prisoners. The figure 350 is being pushed around and that all the pre Olso prisoners who are not Israeli Citizens will be released. Some of these prisoners will be released at the start of the talks and the rest in stages.

It is unclear if the Linvi Erekat talks are the talks themselves, or if they are talks to lead to more talks. Martin Indyk has been tapped to lead the talks as envoy for the US with both Abbas and Bibi agreeing.

On 67 lines and settlement freeze it seems that Kerry used the two letter system. To the Palestinians he wrote in his invite that the 67 lines would form the basis. To the Israelis he did not write that this would be a framework. To both parties he wrote a technical description of the talks. Within the technical description both parties promised to not make moves that would disrupt the talks (read settlements and international moves). They also agreed that only Kerry and a select few would be authorized to speak on the talks.

The secrecy seems necessary to get the parties on board, yet has led to much confusion on the ground on what has actually been agreed to, with the PLO saying that these are talks before the talks and that these have not been fully agreed to yet while the Israelis are reporting that these are the actual talks. While secrecy is important, the fear will be that rumors can fill the void that can damage the ability of the teams to negotiate. There is no good way to solve this issue.

The EU decree on settlements seems to have allowed Abbas to save face, create a stick for the Israelis and come at the right time to push the parties together. Whether the move was coordinated or a happy coincidence has not been resolved.

It seems that Abbas has staked his own reputation and that of the talks on prisoner releases hoping that getting something tangible will help bring public support for the talks. For Bibi it was the best of all bad options.

We wait to see when talks start in DC and if these will be able to make progress in order to have Bibi and Abbas in the same room. The timeframe people are looking at is between 6-9 months.

I will continue to update this post as things contiune.

UPDATE 7/29/13

The State department announced the preliminary talks to take place tonight between Livni, Molho (Bibi’s personal envoy) and Erekat and Shatyyeh. The hope is that by Tuesday there will be an announcement of the frames of the talks to last around 9 months.

The talks started after Bibi convinced his cabinet to release all of the 104 pre-Oslo prisoners. In an unpopular move Bibi won the cabinet vote with the prisoners being released in 4 stages.Most controversial were the Arab citizens of Israel and the Jerusalem residents who were on the agreed list. Many balked at the PA dictating terms for Israel’s own citizens.

A comprise deal was put on the table where all the Arab Citizens of Israel and Jerusalem residents would be in the last round of releases. Bibi, Boogie, Livni, Piron and Aaronovitch make up a 5 member committee that will over see this process.

Bibi also fast tracked a referendum law that would mean that any peace deal would be subject to a popular vote.

In Ramallah there were small demonstrations against the return to negotiations.

Martin Indyk was named today as the special envoy for the talks.

UPDATE 7/30/13

The first joint press conference between Livni, Erekat and Kerry happened following a dinner, a meeting with Obama and Biden and some more talks.

Kerry announced that there will be a 9 month process where everything will be on the table – all final status issues and all core issues. The next round of talks will happen in two weeks in either Israel of the West Bank. In the coming days Israel will ease conditions in West Bank and Gaza. Kerry is the only person authorized to speak about the talks – he urged everyone not to believe any thing that he does not say – and he stressed he would be saying little.

He also mentioned that the Quartet econ track would continue alongside as would General Allen’s security track with the Israelis. He stressed the mutually beneficial things that can come from reasonable principled compromises.

He finished by saying that there is no alternative to 2 States and that time was running out to get there.

Erekat made a short statement thanking the US and stating that no one benefits more from a deal then Palestinians.

Livni made a slightly longer statement about the sacrifices Israel has made to get to this point and hopes to get to a historic breakthrough.

 

 

Kerry vs Bennett for the hearts and minds of the Diaspora

Ha’aretz 6/6/13 

Earlier this week, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry made an impassioned plea to the American Jewish community to rededicate itself to the two-state solution. Kerry has moved his ticking clocks from years to days, declaring if we don’t get the talks moving now, we never will. Yet, while Kerry is making his pitch to get the American Jewish community involved, Israel’s minister for Diaspora affairs is less keen.

Let me explain. During the coalition talks, Naftali Bennett asked for the roles of public diplomacy and Diaspora affairs and religious services to be included with his industry, trade and labor portfolio.

The public diplomacy and Diaspora affairs and the religious services portfolios have the greatest potential to shape the relationship between Israel and her Diaspora. Both of these jobs were demanded by Bennett, head of the Habayit Hayehudi party, home of the national religious the settlers.

Before trying to understand why Bennett wanted these jobs, it is important to clarify what these portfolios actually do. In the case of public diplomacy and Diaspora affairs, the minister is effectively the government’s foreign minister to Jewish communities abroad. Of all the formal and informal links between Israel and communities of the Jewish DiasporaTaglit-Birthright sits as the jewel in the crown, coordinating the visits of thousands of young Jews to Israel every year.

The Religious Services Ministry controls all issues of religion within Israel in addition to cultivating religious ties to the Diaspora. Alongside getting involved in the messy business of setting budgets for the yeshivot and state employed rabbis, it is the central battleground between the progressive streams of Judaism and the Orthodox establishment.

By taking both of these portfolios, Bennett, the Modern-Orthodox former chief of the Yesha Council of settlers, has put himself at the center of the two points of friction between Israel and the Diaspora, namely the growth of settlements and the status of progressive Jewish rights within Israel.

Two weeks ago, we found out that the Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs Ministry had been handed over to Bennett, but not before it was stripped of everything that made it a ministry. Even Taglit-Birthright, the flagship program, was moved back into the Prime Minister’s Office along with the Masa Israel Journey program.

Yet Bennett has managed to turn his empty ministry into a tool that he can use to sell himself and his party to the Diaspora. Having grown up as a child of olim (immigrants), Bennett understands the Jewish-American community well. He knows that they want to see more religious pluralism within Israel and those they are not particularly fond of settlements.

Through the Religious Services Ministry, Bennett has made somesurprising moves that have enabled, for the first time, non-Orthodox rabbis to receive state money. In changing the model of how rabbinical figures receive their salaries, he has opened up the system to the non-Orthodox without having to deal with the issue head on. This policy, coupled with his move to allow Israelis to get married with any rabbinical council within Israel, is changing the landscape for progressive Jews within Israel.

By ingratiating himself with the progressive community, no easy feat as the head of a religious Zionist party, Bennett is demonstrating his value to the Diaspora on the issues that matter to them. Through his empty title of public diplomacy and Diaspora affairs minister, he has the right to be able to talk directly to Jewish communities about these achievements.

He hopes, one expects, that through his fight for equality for all Jews he will become a champion for Diaspora Jewry. In doing so, he will have succeeded in his quest to become a politician for all the Jewish people, not just those who live in the West Bank.

Through normalizing himself as a change maker, he will be able to bring himself and his party into the Diaspora’s mainstream. His policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians should not stop him being accepted if he is breaking the stranglehold of the ultra-Orthodox on issues that directly affect Reform and Conservative Jews.

So, while John Kerry hopes to motivate Jews in America to put pressure on the Israelis to reach a two-state solution with the Palestinians, Bennett is giving that same community legislative wins within the Knesset. It will be fascinating to see how dividing American Jews between two issues so keen to their heart will play out. The real question, however, remains: How much time is there before the clock runs out and there is no real choice to make? Time is certainly in Bennett’s favor, but whether he becomes a welcome figure in the established Jewish community of America waits to be seen.

Kerry’s Task: Close the Incredulity Gap

Daily Beast 24/5/13

With Ghaith al-Omari and Danielle Spiegel Feld

President Obama’s challenge to the thousand Israeli students he addressed in Jerusalem was clear: “Speaking as a politician, I can promise you this: political leaders will not take risks if the people do not demand that they do. You must create the change that you want to see.” The President, once a community organizer himself, understands the importance of grassroots momentum to change the status quo.

Secretary of State John Kerry has since made important progress towards reviving the two-state agenda: On the political front, the Israelis appear to have agreed to impose a settlement freeze of sorts, while the Palestinians have temporarily agreed not to pursue international legal actions against Israel. On the economic front, a private sector team of business leaders now stands ready to examine investment opportunities within the West Bank. And regionally, the Arab League has revived its 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, demonstrating that there is still Arab support for the idea of two states.

Yet, despite these promising developments, the Israeli and Palestinian publics are no closer to believing that peace is on its way.

The latest Pew polls report that 61 percent of Palestinians believe there is no way for an independent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully with Israel. Within Israel the figures are somewhat better—only 38 percent see no way to coexist—but the whole peace process was still virtually ignored in Israel’s last elections.

Thus, even though poll after poll indicates a plurality of each population would accept a two-state solution, a vast “incredulity gap” remains within each society. The physical erosion of the two-state solution due to settlement expansion, provocations by each sides’ leaders, violence that followed the Gaza disengagement, and relentless effects of the occupation, are causing both peoples to lose faith in the ideal of two states living beside each other in peace.

The incredulity gap poses a serious hurdle for Secretary Kerry. If the people do not believe a two-state solution is plausible, they will not actively push for it. And as President Obama made clear, without strong stakeholder engagement, there will be no pressure on political leaders to return to the negotiating table, nor remain there if the talks do take place.

There is, however, one bright spot in the recent polling data: a plurality of Israelis and Palestinians wants President Obama to play a bigger role in resolving the conflict (49 percent of Israelis and 41 percent of Palestinians). This provides an opening for Secretary Kerry to speak directly to these constituencies, bolstering support for civil society groups on both sides of the Green Line.

These groups need this extra attention: We cannot expect the grassroots in the region to make change when the mediators seeking to achieve that change pass them over.

The U.S. has established an admirable record of supporting people-to-people dialogue and regional cooperative initiatives, particularly through the auspices of U.S. AID funding programs. The Obama Administration is also in the midst of an important project to map the different civil society groups in the region to see how American support can best be allocated.

But given the urgency of the moment, the Administration needs to do more. The most immediate way of doing so is for Secretary Kerry to elevate the profile of Israeli and Palestinian two-state advocacy groups by meeting with select organizations during his next visit to the region. This meeting should mark the beginning of heightened U.S. engagement with civil society groups within each nation.

Many Palestinians believe that the U.S. has been deaf to their plight and blinded to the changing realities on the ground. By speaking with Palestinians directly, the Secretary can start a conversation that demonstrates he understands their position and promotes their understanding of his.

To be most effective, Secretary Kerry will need to speak with representatives of the varied voices of Palestinian civil society, including those who have remained active in peace advocacy as well as those who have grown too pessimistic to continue investing in the two-state solution. Kerry might not like all that he hears from these groups, but without engaging all these stakeholders, he will not be able to bring the people with him in this process.

Engaging with peace advocates in Israel is equally as important. Despite the fact that a majority of Israelis still identify the two-state solution as their preferred outcome, Israeli groups advocating two states are demoralized right now. By giving these groups an audience, Secretary Kerry can help reenergize Israel’s committed two-state advocates, emboldening them in their fight against the skepticism that abounds. And by speaking with political groups outside of the committed “left,” the Secretary can help publicize news of the promising recent developments, hopefully chipping away at the sense of futility that fuels many Israelis’ detachment.

With the same enthusiasm that Secretary Kerry has approached the economic, political and regional dynamics, he must now try to bring the people on board by directly engaging with those who have suffered the continued failures of initiatives past, building their support for efforts to start anew. If he is diligent in this task, the Secretary may just be able to translate his early diplomatic progress into concrete changes on the ground.